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FEATURE COMMENT—The European 
Defense Procurement Directive: An 
American Perspective
Introduction—On August 21, the new European 
directive on defense and security procurement, 
Directive 2009/81/EC, entered into force. See, e.g., 
EU Adopts New Defense and Security Procurement 
Directive, 6 IGC ¶ 65. Previously, most European 
defense procurement was considered exempt from 
the European procurement directives that have 
harmonized procurement, with greater transpar-
ency and competition, across Europe. Under the 
new defense directive, all but the most sensitive 
defense and security procurements in Europe will 
have to be conducted under rules consistent with 
the new directive. 
From an American vantage point, however, 
it is not yet clear how the new directive will be 
implemented. If the defense directive merely brings 
new competition and transparency to the Euro-
pean procurement markets, the directive will be a 
welcome improvement in what was traditionally a 
closed and uncompetitive market. But if, in practice, 
the directive is used as an excuse to discriminate 
against U.S. exporters—or if it is perceived as a 
tool of discrimination—the directive threatens to 
trigger serious trade frictions in the transatlantic 
defense markets.
The European Defense Market—When 
compared to the U.S. defense market, the European 
defense market is smaller and highly fragmented 
across the European member states—in part, as the 
European Commission itself has noted, because of 
the highly fragmented laws across the many na-
tions. See European Commission, Interpretative 
Communication on the Application of Article 296 
of the Treaty in the Field of Defense Procurement, 
COM(2006)779, Introduction (“Defence procure-
ment law is an important element of this frag-
mentation. The majority of defence contracts are 
exempted from Internal Market rules and awarded 
on the basis of national procurement rules, which 
have widely differing selection criteria, advertising 
procedures, etc. ... All of this can limit market access 
for non-national suppliers and therefore hampers 
intra-European competition.”); Europe’s Movement 
Toward a More Competitive Market for Defense 
Procurement, 1 IGC ¶ 46.
The fragmentation of the European defense 
market, and the stronger political emphasis put 
on defense spending in the U.S., mean that U.S. 
defense expenditures tend to loom large when com-
pared to the individual European nations’ defense 
spending. The Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute estimates that U.S. defense spend-
ing in 2008 totaled over $600 billion, substantially 
overshadowing any other single nation’s defense 
spending. See chart above, “$Billions in 2008 De-
fense Expenditures,” with data from SIPRI 2009 
Yearbook, at 11, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/
files/SIPRIYB09summary.pdf. 
The European Commission estimated in 
2004 that overall defense expenditures in the EU 
member states totaled approximately €160 billion 
(roughly $235 billion at current exchange rates). 
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See European Commission, COM(2004)608, Green 
Paper on Defence Procurement, at 3 (2005), available 
at ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/
dpp_en.htm; Aris Georgopoulos, The Commission’s 
Green Paper on Defence Procurement, 2005 Pub. 
Proc. L. Rev. NA34. The overall European defense 
procurement market has been estimated at more 
than €80 billion (over approximately $117 billion) an-
nually; of that, the European Commission estimated 
in 2006, roughly €30 billion ($45 billion) went to new 
equipment. European Commission Press Release 
IP/06/1703 (Dec. 7, 2006). 
The barriers between the European member 
states’ defense markets historically have been high, 
due to national preferences and cumbersome licens-
ing requirements for transferring sensitive technolo-
gies across borders. See, e.g., David R. Scruggs, Guy 
Ben-Ari, Michele Flournoy and Julianne Smith, Cen-
ter for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap 
Between Strategy and Capabilities, at 74-75 (October 
2005), available at csis.org/publication/european-
defense-integration-bridging-gap-between-strategy-
and-capabilities; Joachim Hofbauer, Implications of 
European Defense Acquisition Reform, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Current Issues 
No. 15 (Oct. 19, 2009); Martin Trybus, European De-
fence Procurement Law (1999).
The EU has been working for some time to im-
prove Europe’s military capabilities, see David R. 
Scruggs et al., supra, at 54–60, and the trend in Euro-
pean defense procurement has been towards greater 
openness and competition, see Jeffrey P. Bialos, 
Christine E. Fisher and Stuart L. Koehl, Fortresses 
and Icebergs: The Evolution of the Transatlantic De-
fense Market and the Implications for U.S. National 
Security Policy, at 12–13 (Johns Hopkins University, 
School of Advanced International Studies, Center 
for Transatlantic Relations) (executive summary 
available at csis.org/event/book-launch-fortresses-
and-icebergs-jeffrey-p-bialos). European policymakers 
hope the new procurement directive, and an earlier 
directive to facilitate intra-European transfers of 
sensitive technologies, see European Commission, 
EU Transfers of Defence-Related Products, ec.europa.
eu/enterprise/regulation/inst_sp/defense_en.htm 
(discussing Directive 2009/43/EC), will help bring 
together the member states’ defense markets, to sup-
port development of the European defense-related 
supplier base. See, e.g., EDA Continues Push for In-
tegrated EU Defense Industry, 4 IGC ¶ 37.
The U.S. has a direct interest in stronger Euro-
pean defense capabilities, as the U.S. will likely work 
closely with its European allies to combat future 
shared threats. See, e.g., Klaus Naumann and Gen. 
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et al., supra, at 4. An important recent report, Jef-
frey P. Bialos et al., Fortresses and Icebergs, supra, 
discussed the current integration between the U.S. 
and European defense industries. The authors of 
this very comprehensive report drew on a metaphor 
commonly used to describe the two markets’ improv-
ing integration, the “iceberg,” to describe relative 
isolation at the platform/systems integrator level, 
and much more extensive integration at lower lev-
els of the supply chain. See figure on previous page, 
“The Transatlantic Defense Industry,” from Jeffrey 
P. Bialos et al., Fortresses and Icebergs, supra, at 7.
Despite this growing integration in the transat-
lantic defense market, the authors of Fortresses and 
Icebergs concluded that, over the coming years, new 
efficiencies within the market and growing external 
barriers to the European defense market—including, 
potentially, efficiencies and barriers caused by the 
defense procurement directive itself—are likely to 
reduce U.S. exporters’ share of that market. Id. at 
12–18; see also Stacy N. Ferraro, The European De-
fense Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming 
Fortress Europe?, 16 Transnat’l & Contemp. Probs. 
549, 620 (2007) (“U.S. defense firms should expect 
increased difficulties competing in Europe with each 
passing year of the [European Defence Agency’s] ex-
istence, which is due to Europe’s creating the legal 
and administrative framework that will facilitate 
the ease of transfer and development of defense 
equipment within Europe”).
The European Procurement Directives—
To understand the European defense procurement 
directive, it is important to understand that the 
defense directive is only the latest in a long series of 
European procurement directives, stretching back 
several decades. See, e.g., Susan R. Sandler, Cross-
Border Competition in the European Union: Public 
Procurement and the European Defence Equipment 
Market, 7 Wash U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 373 (2008). 
These directives set frameworks—a minimum set 
of requirements—within which member states may 
write their procurement laws and rules. If a European 
member state’s procurement procedures or practices 
violate the directives, interested parties (including, 
potentially, a disappointed bidder) may seek relief, 
potentially (depending on the circumstances) through 
the Commission, the courts, or other bid protest (or 
“remedies”) mechanisms.
The directives have grown increasingly detailed 
and prescriptive over the years, as the European 
Commission has pushed to exert more control over 
the sometimes fractious European procurement 
market. See generally Sue Arrowsmith, The Past 
and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From 
Framework to Common Code?, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 337 
(2006); Jean-Jacques Verdeaux, Public Procurement 
in the European Union and in the United States: A 
Comparative Study, 32 Pub. Cont. L.J. 713 (2003); 
Charlene Barshefsky, Alastair Sutton and Jo Anne 
Swindler, Developments in EC Procurement Law 
Under the 1992 Program, 1990 Brig. Young U. L. Rev. 
1269; Allen B. Green, European Community Procure-
ment—Part II, 91-6 Briefing Papers 1. The directives’ 
core goal is simple: to unify procurement markets 
across the European continent, by harmonizing pro-
curement rules and processes.
The Defense Directive—The latest directive 
extends the goal of European integration to defense 
markets by establishing a common framework for 
defense procurements across the member states. See, 
e.g., Wolfram Hertel, Falk Schning and David W. Bur-
gett, Feature Comment: New EU Legal Framework for 
the Defense Industry, 50 GC ¶ 399; see also Baudouin 
Heuninckx, A Primer to Collaborative Defence Pro-
curement in Europe: Troubles, Achievements and Pros-
pects, 2008 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 123 (discussing option 
of collaborative procurement). The new directive is 
intended to counter what was an “historically nation-
alistic approach to defense procurement,” which cut 
“against the core princip[les] of the European Commu-
nity, which has as its central premise—inherent in its 
treaty obligations—the concept of a ‘single market.’ ” 
Jeffrey P. Bialos et al., Fortresses and Icebergs, supra, 
at 181; see also Aris Georgopoulos, Comment on the 
Recent Developments in European Defence Procure-
ment Integration Initiatives, 2008 Pub. Pro. L. Rev. 
NA8.
The new directive squarely addresses two of the 
leading objections to general European requirements 
for defense procurement. See, e.g., Tim Briggs, The 
New Defence Procurement Directive, 2009 Pub. Proc. 
L. Rev. NA129. First, the new directive includes spe-
cial provisions, not part of the general procurement 
directives (Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC), 
to accommodate classified information and security 
of supply. Second, the new directive exempts mem-
ber states’ procurements if they “are so sensitive 
that even the new rules cannot satisfy their security 
needs.” Commission Press Release IP/09/1250 (Aug. 
25, 2009).
¶ 383
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This latter point—which sensitive procurements 
should be exempt from European regulation and left 
to the sovereign discretion of the member states—had 
long been contentious. See, e.g., Aris Georgopoulos, 
The European Commission Proposal for the Enact-
ment of a Defence Procurement Directive, 2008 Pub. 
Proc. L. Rev. 81; Baudouin Heuninckx, Towards a 
Coherent European Defence Procurement Regime? 
European Defence Agency and European Commission 
Initiatives, 2008 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 1. Article 296 of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
protects member states’ sovereignty, and allows any 
member state to “take such measures as it considers 
necessary for the protection of the essential interests 
of its security which are connected with the produc-
tion of or trade in arms, munitions and war material.” 
See Sue Arrowsmith, supra, 35 Pub. Cont. L. J. at 
367–68. 
While the European Court of Justice’s decisions 
had interpreted Article 296 narrowly, as the European 
Commission acknowledged in a 2004 position paper, 
“in the absence of a precise interpretation of these 
provisions, there is quasisystematic use of the dero-
gation in the area of public procurement.” European 
Commission, Green Paper on Defence Procurement, 
supra, at 6. The Commission noted that, despite the 
ECJ’s clarifications of Article 296, “the low number 
of [defense procurement] publications in the Official 
Journal of the European Union [the official gazette 
for publicizing European procurement opportuni-
ties] appear[ed] to imply that some Member States 
believe[d] they [could] apply the derogation auto-
matically.” Id. Thus, despite a cautionary Commission 
Interpretative Communication on the Application of 
Article 296, supra; see also Aris Georgopoulos, The 
Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the 
Application of Article 296 EC in the Field of Defence 
Procurement, 2007 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA43; EU Con-
tinues Efforts to Build Up Defense Industry, 4 IGC ¶ 
10, apparently many member states have been rou-
tinely ignoring the existing procurement directives 
when they carry out defense procurements.
As a form of secondary procurement legislation, 
the defense directive is an important step forward, 
though it is certainly not a radical step forward:
s  $IRECTIVE !LLOWS &LEXIBLE 0ROCUREMENT -ETH-
ods: Recognizing the complexity of most defense 
procurements, the new directive takes a more 
flexible approach to permitted procurement 
methods. The directive would permit, inter alia, 
publicized “negotiated” procurements (what we 
in the U.S. would call less than full-and-open 
competition, or, in extreme cases, “sole-source” 
procurements), and competitive dialogue (the 
analogue to contracting by competitive negotia-
tion under Federal Acquisition Regulation pt. 
15 in the U.S. federal system). See Directive 
2009/81/EC, Chapter V. From a U.S. perspec-
tive, what is surprising is the defense direc-
tive’s drafters’ slight reluctance to allow the 
use of competitive dialogue, see id. Article 37 
(report required explaining use of competitive 
dialogue). In U.S. defense procurement, the 
parallel procedures (competitive negotiations 
under FAR pt. 15) are, in contrast, the norm in 
advanced weapon systems procurements.
s  $IRECTIVE !LLOWS &RAMEWORK )$)1	 #ONTRACTS 
The new directive also specifically allows 
“framework” agreements, which are known in 
the U.S. federal system as indefinite-delivery, 
indefinite-quantity contracts. On both sides 
of the Atlantic, these are increasingly popular 
vehicles for contracting. See Christopher R. 
Yukins, Are IDIQs Inefficient? Sharing Lessons 
with European Framework Contracting, 37 Pub. 
Cont. L.J. 545 (2008). 
s  3OCIOECONOMIC 0ROGRAMS %ASED  FROM $EFENSE 
Procurements: In many nations, European 
defense procurement has long been burdened 
with socioeconomic goals. “Many European 
defense procurement programs today,” noted a 
2005 CSIS report, “are indirect jobs programs; 
parliaments across Europe embed the retention 
of jobs into their defense procurement budgets 
as a central goal even when these policies result 
in higher costs than buying equipment from 
alternative sources.” David R. Scruggs et al., 
European Defense Integration, supra, at 72. The 
defense directive attempts to ease socioeconomic 
goals—specifically, jobs creation—from the Euro-
pean defense realm, by insisting that “no perfor-
mance conditions may pertain to requirements 
other than those relating to the performance of 
the contract itself.” Recital (45); see Article 20. 
This bar is apparently intended, at least in part, 
to exclude extraneous conditions—including so-
cioeconomic requirements that are not directly 
related to contract performance.
s  "ID  0ROTESTS2EMEDIES In keeping with the 
European nations’ increasing reliance on bid 
¶ 383
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protest (“remedies”) systems, see, e.g., Martin 
Dischendorfer and Sue Arrowsmith, Case Com-
ment: Case C-212/02, Commission v. Austria: 
The Requirement for Effective Remedies to Chal-
lenge an Award Decision, 2004 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 
NA165, Title IV of the new defense directive 
includes extensive provisions for challenges to 
awards under the new directive. There are no 
parallel provisions for protests under the U.S.’ 
reciprocal defense agreements with European 
nations (discussed below), and so one logical 
question would be whether these remedies pro-
visions should be incorporated by reference into 
those bilateral agreements, to ensure that U.S. 
exporters have recourse to review to challenge 
discrimination they may experience in the Eu-
ropean defense market.
Potential Discriminatory Impact—European 
policymakers have been careful to emphasize that 
the new directive is not, on its face, discriminatory 
against U.S. and other foreign exporters to the Euro-
PEAN DEFENSE MARKET ! h&REQUENTLY !SKED 1UESTIONv 
posted with the new directive noted:
Directive 2009/81/EC will not change the situa-
tion for arms trade with third countries, which 
remain governed by [World Trade Organization] 
rules and in particular the Government Pro-
curement Agreement (GPA). It remains Member 
States’ decision to open or not to open competi-
tion to non-EU suppliers, in compliance with the 
GPA. Awarding authorities will still be free to 
invite EU companies exclusively, or to include 
non-EU companies.
 ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/
docs/defence/faqs_28-08-09_en.pdf. By its terms, the 
directive also will not cover procurements done under 
cooperative arrangements (such as European nations’ 
joint defense initiatives with NATO), see Recital 
(28), and procurements governed by member states’ 
separate agreements with other nations (such as the 
U.S. reciprocal defense agreements, discussed below), 
id. Recital (26). See Directive 2009/81/EC, Recitals 
(26), (28), Articles 12 (contracts awarded pursuant to 
international rules) & 13 (specific exclusions). These 
exclusions will likely provide U.S. vendors with im-
portant safe harbors against discrimination.
Nevertheless, there remains serious concern that 
in practice the new directive could be used to discrimi-
nate against U.S. (and other foreign) vendors. For U.S. 
exporters, this is an especially acute concern because 
for many years U.S. defense exports to Europe have 
consistently exceeded (by wide margins) European 
defense exports to the U.S.—an “imbalance” of which 
Europeans have been keenly aware, and which has 
itself stirred trade frictions. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bialos 
et al., Fortresses and Icebergs, supra, at 122–23; Aris 
Georgopoulos, U.S. Air Force Tanker Contract: Re-
visiting American Protectionism in Defence Procure-
ment?, 2008 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA162. To maintain 
their share of the European market, U.S. exporters 
will likely remain highly sensitive to the potentially 
discriminatory impacts of the new directive:
s  $IRECTIVE (INTS AT 0OWER TO %XCLUDE "ECAUSE 
as noted, the WTO GPA generally does not 
cover defense materiel, the directive leaves 
open the possibility that European member 
states may exclude foreign vendors in the de-
fense market. The general exclusion of defense 
materiel from the GPA, notes Recital (18) of 
the directive, “means also that in the specific 
context of defence and security markets, Mem-
ber States retain the power to decide whether 
or not their contracting authority/entity may 
allow economic operators from third countries 
to participate in contract award procedures.” 
Although the directive suggests that member 
states “should take that decision on grounds 
of value for money,” and recognizes the need 
for “open and fair markets,” the directive also 
recognizes “the need for a globally competitive 
European Defence Technological and Indus-
trial Base,” and the importance of “obtaining 
of mutual benefits”—all of which may be read, 
by some, to countenance discrimination against 
foreign defense contractors.
s  3PECIAL  3ECURITY 2EQUIREMENTS -AY %XCLUDE 
U.S. Firms: The new defense directive specifical-
ly allows for requiring special security measures 
in procurement, and for requiring security of 
supply. E.g., Directive 2009/81/EC, Recital (42), 
Articles 7 (protection of classified information), 
22 (security of information), 23 (security of sup-
ply). The recitals further call for a “[European] 
Union-wide regime on security of information, 
including the mutual recognition of national 
security clearances and allowing the exchange 
of classified information between contracting au-
thorities/entities and European companies,” and 
specifically acknowledge that, for now, member 
states have extensive discretion in setting secu-
¶ 383
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rity requirements. Id. Recitals (9), (68). As this 
internal European security regime continues to 
take shape, U.S. firms may find that this raises, 
in practice, a barrier to entry to the European 
defense market.
s  4ECHNICAL  3PECIFICATIONS -AY  )N  0RACTICE 
Discriminate: Unlike the WTO GPA, which 
specifically calls for nondiscriminatory techni-
cal specifications, the new defense directive 
gives a preference to technical specifications 
based on “international,” “European” or “na-
tional” standards. See Directive 2009/81/
EC, Recital (38), Article 18 (technical speci-
fications). In practice, this may discrimi-
nate against U.S. products built around 
non-European, and non-international , 
standards.
s  3PECIALLY  3ENSITIVE  0ROCUREMENTS %XCLUDED 
By its terms, per Recital (27) and Article 13, 
the directive excludes specially sensitive 
procurements, including “procurements pro-
vided by intelligence services, or procure-
ment for all types of intelligence activities ... 
as defined by Member States,” and “particularly 
sensitive purchases which require an extremely 
high level of confidentiality, such as ... certain 
purchases intended for border protection or 
combating terrorism.” Because of the subjective 
and broad nature of these exemptions, they may 
be overused, in practice, to shield procurements 
from the transparency and competition that the 
new directive would normally require.
s  !RTICLE  ,OOPHOLE 3TILL !VAILABLE !LTHOUGH 
the intent behind the new defense directive was 
to narrow the instances when member states 
can claim exemption from general procurement 
rules on grounds of national security, per Ar-
ticle 296, Recital (16) of the new directive itself 
leaves the door open for asserting an exemption 
under Article 296 where, for example, “contracts 
in the fields of both defence and security ... 
necessitate such extremely demanding se-
curity of supply requirements or which are 
so confidential and/or important for national 
sovereignty that even the specific provisions 
of this Directive are not sufficient to safeguard 
Member States’ essential security interests.” By 
leaving this door open to defense procurements 
outside the directive, the Commission has left 
open the possibility that member states—which 
retain “sole responsibility” for their national se-
curity, id. Recital (1)—may attempt to exclude 
foreign competition by asserting exemptions 
under Article 296.
s  ,IMITED 0ROTECTIONS 5NDER 74/ '0! The GPA, 
which European policymakers often point to 
as the main guarantor of open markets, gener-
ally does not cover trade in arms, munitions 
and defense materials. See GPA, Art. XXIII(1) 
(“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent any Party from taking any action or 
not disclosing any information which it consid-
ers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests relating to the procurement of 
arms, ammunition or war materials, or to pro-
curement indispensable for national security or 
for national defence purposes.”). Specific nations’ 
coverage under the GPA also tends to exclude 
defense items; for example, the European Com-
munities’ Annex 1 to the WTO GPA, which lists 
the European agencies and products open to 
competition from other GPA members, covers 
only part of the defense market. Id., available 
at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/
appendices_e.htm. Many European procur-
ing entities and procurements are simply not 
covered by the GPA, which has always focused 
primarily on non-defense procurement.
s  2ECIPROCAL $EFENSE !GREEMENTS $O .OT 0ROVIDE 
Complete Protection Against Discrimination: 
For decades, the U.S. and many of the European 
Community’s member nations have agreed, 
through bilateral memoranda of understand-
ing (reciprocal defense agreements), to open 
their respective defense procurement markets. 
See Drew B. Miller, Note, Is It Time to Reform 
Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?, 
39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 93 (2009) (forthcoming); 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal 
Procurement: International Agreements Result 
in Waivers of Some U.S. Domestic Source Re-
strictions (GAO-05-188), at 23 (2005) (listing 
countries), www.gao.gov/new.items/d05188.pdf; 
International Agreements Waive U.S. Domestic 
Source Restrictions, 47 GC ¶ 89. These bilateral 
agreements are implemented in U.S. law through 
§ 225.872 of the Defense FAR Supplement, 
and are gathered at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/
cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoranda_ 
of_understanding.html. Under these agreements, 
¶ 383
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the U.S. has generally agreed not to discriminate 
against defense supplies from partner “qualifying 
nations.” These agreements, which cover many, 
but not all, of the European member states, do 
not provide complete protection against discrimi-
nation in the transatlantic defense trade. See 
Drew B. Miller, supra. For example, as noted, un-
like the GPA, these agreements typically do not 
include a provision allowing suppliers to protest 
(sue for remedies) under national law to enforce 
their rights against discrimination; instead, the 
agreements generally leave it to the signatory 
defense ministries to resolve any disagreements 
through consultation. See, e.g., Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Federal Minister of 
Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Secretary of Defense of the United States of 
America Concerning the Principles Governing 
Mutual Cooperation in the Research and Devel-
opment, Production, Procurement and Logistic 
Support of Defense Equipment, Art. VII (1978), 
www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-germany.
pdf. If U.S. vendors fear discrimination under 
the new directive, they may press for broader 
remedies under these bilateral agreements.
Conclusion—The challenge for the U.S. procure-
ment community is to see the new defense directive 
as part of a changing, dynamic transatlantic defense 
market, and to understand how the directive relates 
to the U.S.’ broader national security interests. If the 
directive, as intended, strengthens the European 
defense supplier base and enhances competition and 
transparency in European defense procurement, the 
directive will advance the U.S.’ interests in a robust 
transatlantic defense market. If, however, the direc-
tive is implemented by member states to lock out U.S. 
or other foreign exporters—or if it is perceived as a 
protectionist tool—the directive may, unfortunately, 
serve as a flashpoint for protectionism.
!
This FEATURE COMMENT was written for THE GOV-
ERNMENT CONTRACTOR by Christopher R. Yukins 
(cyukins@law.gwu.edu), Associate Professor of 
Government Contract Law and Co-Director of 
the Government Procurement Law Program at 
The George Washington University Law School.
Author’s Note: On Friday, November 6, at The George 
Washington University Law School, 2000 H Street 
N.W., Washington, D.C., from 9:30–11:00 a.m., a col-
loquium will be held on the new European defense 
procurement directive. For further information on the 
colloquium, please visit www.pubklaw.com/events/
gwu110609.pdf.
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